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L A W
Interpreting die ADA and 
Civil Rights Law
Five Supreme Court 
Rulings
by David Sheruryn, 
Zev J. Eigen, and 
Adam A . Klausner
Although one could say that employers found some clarification in human-resources 
law in 1999, certain complications still remain.
Ihe U.S. Supreme Court decided five employment-law cases at the end of its 1998-99 term. In the first three cases, employers’ hiring practices were upheld when the 
court chose to interpret the Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
narrowly by holding that plaintiffs’ 
self-administered corrective mea­
sures (i.e., any and all methods, de­
vices, or medication that alleviate or 
reduce their impairment) may not 
be disregarded for purposes of quali­
fying under the ADA’s definition of 
“disabled.” Thus, for example, indi­
viduals may not remove their glasses 
and then claim successfully that they 
are vision impaired and therefore 
disabled under the act. As we ex­
plain in this article, however, those 
three cases leave open a gap that 
could render the opinions shallow 
in their application.
In a fourth, unrelated case de­
cided in the 1999 term, the court 
clarified the circumstances under 
which an employer may be held 
liable for punitive damages under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. Finally, in a fifth case, the
Supreme Court held that individuals 
who have proven that they are 
“totally disabled” for the purpose 
of receiving social-security benefits 
(and thus “cannot engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful 
work”) may still claim protection 
under the ADA by showing that 
“with reasonable accommodation” 
they could “perform the essential 
functions” of their jobs.
The first three cases dealing with 
the ADA received considerable me­
dia attention, most likely due to the 
potential effect those rulings have 
on so many individuals. If easily 
correctable impairments such as 
myopia were deemed disabilities
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under the ADA, the number of po­
tential plaintiffs would instantly 
skyrocket. Those three ADA cases, 
however* are not the strong victory 
for employers trumpeted by the 
media and may instead merely give 
e in p l o y e r s  a false sense o f security. 
Moreover* the other two cases, deal­
ing with the availability o f punitive 
civil-rights damages and with har­
monization of SSI and ADA claims, 
may ultimately be more troubling 
for employers because they will 
likely lead to additional claims and 
m  increase in the average cost to 
seide those claims.
T i l l  article examines each of the 
fhre cases by explaining the courts 
htiWSl^gi.and discussing their practi­
cal ^ fe ts*  and then proposes strate­
gies to avoid victimization under 
the new rulings.
l iM M i i p a i r m e n t s  under the ADA
The ADA prohibits employers from 
dkciinianating against disabled indi­
viduals in rendering employment 
decisions. The statute defines a 
qualified individual as “an individual 
with a disability who, with or with­
out reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires.”1
A “disability” is defined in one of 
three ways: (1) “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activi­
ties of such individual,” (2) “a 
record of such an impairment,” or 
(3) “being regarded as having such 
an impairment.”2 In past cases, 
courts have set standards for what 
qualifies as a “substantial limitation” 
and a “major life activity.”
The three cases decided at the 
end of the 1998-99 term posed the 
following two legal issues. First, is 
an individual “disabled” when he or 
she has a condition that, if left un­
*42 U.S.C. §1211(8). 
242 U.S.C. §12102(2).
corrected, “substantially limits a 
major fife activity,” but when cor­
rected leaves that individual without 
any impairment? Second, is a person 
who is denied a job because of his 
or her corrected impairment(s) con­
sidered “regarded as having such an 
impairment” and therefore entitled 
to recovery under the act?
In all three of these ADA cases, 
the Supreme Court answered the 
first question by holding that an 
individual’s corrections, medications, 
and even subconscious mechanisms 
for coping with an impairment are 
to be considered when assessing 
whether that individual is disabled.
In addressing the second issue, 
however, the court ruled narrowly 
and by doing so left unresolved an 
important legal theory that leaves 
employers and lawyers with unan­
swered questions.
The Case of the Lazy Eye
The first case, Albertsons, Inc. v. Hallie 
Kirkingburg, arose from the following 
circumstances. Albertsons, Inc., a 
grocery-store chain, hired Hallie 
Kirkingburg as a truck driver. 
Kirkingburg had more than ten 
years’ driving experience and passed 
the Albertsons road test.3 Prior to 
his being hired, Kirkingburg was 
examined by a doctor to determine 
whether he met federally imposed 
vision standards for commercial 
truck drivers. Kirkingburg suffers 
from amblyopia (known as “lazy 
eye”), an uncorrectable condition 
that leaves him with 20/200 vision 
in his left eye and, in effect, mo­
nocular vision. Although this condi­
tion renders Kirkingburg unfit to 
drive a commercial truck under 
federal Department of Transporta­
tion standards, the doctor mistakenly 
certified that Kirkingburg met the 
basic vision standard. Consequently, 
Albertsons hired him.4
31999 U.S. Lexis 4369,1 (6/22/99). 
4Id. at 7, 8.
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After injuring himself on the 
job nearly a year and a half later, 
Kirkingburg went for a physical, at 
which time the original doctor’s 
error was discovered. Kirkingburg 
was informed of an experimental 
D O T scheme wherein individuals 
who fail the basic vision standards 
may receive a waiver of the stan­
dards under certain limited circum­
stances and as long as they agree to 
report for annual reevaluations of 
their condition.5 Kirkingburg ap­
plied for and received such a waiver 
from the DOT. Albertsons, however, 
had terminated him for failing to 
meet the D O T vision standards 
before the waiver was granted and 
refused to rehire him.
After Kirkingburg sued Albert­
sons alleging discrimination under 
the ADA, the N inth Circuit found 
that he was disabled. Albertsons 
then sought review by the Supreme 
Court.
The Supreme Court addressed 
only whether the Ninth Circuit 
erred in labeling plaintiff Kirking­
burg disabled under the ADA. (The 
court did not need to address the 
issue of whether Albertsons re­
garded Kirkingburg as disabled since 
Albertsons did not challenge that 
aspect of the appellate decision.6) 
The court set out three reasons why 
the N inth Circuit was too hasty in 
qualifying Kirkingburg as disabled.
First, according to the Supreme 
Court majority, the N inth Circuit 
erred by expanding the ADA’s defi­
nition o f disability. The N inth Cir­
cuit held that the plaintiff was 
disabled because there was a “differ­
ence” between him and those not 
afflicted by the condition in ques-
5The D O T  allows licensure o f applicants with 
deficient vision who had three years o f  recent 
experience driving a commercial vehicle without 
a license suspension or revocation, involvement 
in a reportable accident in which the applicant 
was cited for a moving violation, conviction for 
certain driving-related offenses, or citation for 
certain serious traffic violations. See: Id. at 8.
6See: Id. at footnote 9.
tion. The Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff must prove that the 
condition posed a “significant re­
striction” on the individual’s ability 
to perform major life activities and 
not that there was simply a “differ­
ence.”7 Thus, the court held that 
only impairments that “substantially 
limit” an individual’s major fife 
functions trigger an individual’s 
protection under the act.
Second, the N inth Circuit sug­
gested that in gauging whether mo­
nocular vision rendered Kirkingburg 
disabled the court need not take 
into account the individual’s ability 
to compensate for the impairment. 
The lower court recognized that the 
plaintiff had developed subconscious 
mechanisms for dealing with his 
vision impairment, but the Ninth 
Circuit did not examine those cop­
ing mechanisms in reaching its con­
clusion that the plaintiff was dis­
abled under the act. The Supreme 
Court held that the determination 
of whether the individual is disabled 
is a function of the fact that the 
employee needed to undertake 
mitigating measures with artificial 
aids such as medication or correc­
tive lenses. That holding extends to 
the “body’s own systems,”8 such as 
the subconscious coping mecha­
nisms employed by Kirkingburg. 
Instead, the question is whether the 
employee— with or without such 
means— is substantially limited.
Third, and as the Supreme Court 
wrote: “perhaps most significantly,” 
the N inth Circuit erred by failing to 
heed the statutory obligation to 
determine the existence of disabili­
ties on a case-by-case basis.9 Specifi­
cally, the court noted that an indi­
vidual can not be labeled disabled 
solely based on his having been 
diagnosed with a particular condi­
tion or ailment. W hat one must 
assess to determine whether an
7Id. at 18.
&Id. at 19.
9Id. at 20.
individual qualifies under the ADA 
is the specific effect that the ail­
ment or impairment has on the 
individual.
The job qualification that 
Albertsons used for visual acuity 
is the standard set by federal law, 
which is binding on Albertsons. The 
only issue left for the court, then, 
was whether Albertsons was obli­
gated to accept Kirkingburg’s ex­
perimental waiver o f the D O T 
visual-acuity standards. The Su­
preme Court held that there was 
no obligation to accept the waiver 
because the regulations establishing 
the waiver program did not modify 
those visual acuity standards. Be­
cause the waiver constituted a D O T 
experiment in safety, there could be 
no fair way to obligate employers to 
accept the exceptions to the origi­
nal safety regulations.
The Case of the Clinical Diagnosis
The second case in which the Su­
preme Court dealt with self-applied 
remedial measures to alleviate po­
tential disabilities under the ADA is 
Murphy u United Parcel Service, Inc.10 
This case arose when UPS fired a 
mechanic, Vaughn Murphy, for hav­
ing high blood pressure.
Like Albertsons, UPS is obligated 
by the D O T to require that me­
chanics meet certain physical re­
quirements where driving commer­
cial motor vehicles is part o f their 
job. One such requirement is that 
the driver have “no current clinical 
diagnosis of high blood pressure 
likely to interfere with his or her 
ability to operate a commercial 
vehicle safely.”11
W hen Murphy was hired by 
UPS, his blood-pressure measure­
ment was too high to qualify for 
D O T  health certification, but nev­
ertheless he was granted certifica­
tion in error. A subsequent test
101999 U.S. Lexis 4370 (6 /22/99). 
n Id. at 7 (Citing 49 CFR §391.41 (b)(6)).
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revealed M urphy’s high blood 
pressure.
For his condition, Murphy takes 
medication that inhibits him from 
lifting heavy objects, but he other­
wise functions normally. The court 
therefore held that Murphy is not 
disabled under the ADA, since the 
positive effects o f the mitigating 
measures Murphy employs— namely, 
the regulation o f his blood pressure 
by medication— are to be factored 
into the analysis o f his condition.
The court then addressed the 
issue o f whether UPS regarded 
Murphy as having a disability that 
substantially limits one or more life 
functions. There are two ways in 
which plaintiffs may be considered 
“regarded as” having a disability.
(1) An employer may mistakenly 
believe that the employee has a 
physical impairment that substan­
tially limits one or more major life 
activities (i.e., the plaintiff doesn’t 
actually suffer from any impairment, 
but the employer nonetheless thinks 
that he or she does based on stereo­
typing or other unfair biases).
(2) An employer may mistakenly 
believe that an actual, nonlimiting 
impairment substantially limits one 
or more major life activities (i.e., the 
plaintiff has an impairment that does 
not actually limit the ability to carry 
out a major life activity, but none­
theless the employer believes that
it does).
The major life activity o f work­
ing is considered actionable under 
the ADA statute if specific criteria 
are met. The Supreme Court looked 
to the Equal Employment O ppor­
tunity Commission (EEOC) guide­
lines to determine when working 
may be the major life activity being 
impaired. The guidelines require 
that the plaintiff be “significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform 
either a class o f jobs or a broad 
range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person 
having comparable training, skills,
and abilities.” The inability to per­
form a single, particular job (e.g., 
one involving heavy lifting) does 
not constitute a substantial limita­
tion in the major life activity of 
working.12 Thus, if jobs using the 
individual’s skill set are available, one 
is not precluded from a substantial 
class o f jobs.13 Also, if  many different 
types o f jobs are available, one is not 
precluded from a broad range of 
jobs.14
Murphy alleged that UPS re­
garded him as being unable to work 
at all because o f his hypertension. In 
response, UPS argued that it did not 
regard Murphy as substantially lim­
ited in the major life activity of 
working, but rather regarded him as 
unqualified to work as a UPS me­
chanic because o f his inability to 
obtain a D O T  health certification.15
The high court held that 
Murphy was at best able to prove 
that he is regarded as unable to per­
form the job o f mechanic only 
when that job requires driving a 
commercial m otor vehicle— which 
is a specifically defined type o f ve­
hicle.16 M urphy could not prove 
that he is regarded as unable to per­
form any mechanic’s job that does 
not require driving a commercial 
motor vehicle or does not require 
the D O T certification. Indeed, 
Murphy could perform many other 
mechanic’s jobs.17 Therefore, the 
court found that UPS did not re­
gard Murphy as disabled.
In the Sides wife Glasses
Because the following case involves 
what appears to be an omitted argu­
ment, Sutton v. United A ir Lines, Inc.,
12See: Sutton v. United A ir  Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 
2150 (1999) (Citing 29 CFR §1630.2(j)(3)(i)).13W.
l4Id.
15Murphy, at 11.
16The court notes that 49 CFR §390.5 defines 
a commercial motor vehicle as a vehicle weigh­
ing over 10,000 pounds, designed to carry 16 or 
more passengers, or used in the transportation o f  
hazardous materials. See: Id. at 15.
17Id. at 16.
is the most important o f the three 
cases that address the issue of 
whether a plaintiff with a self­
corrected condition may be consid­
ered disabled under the ADA. In the 
majority opinion Justice O ’Connor 
hints that an omitted argument 
could have prompted a different 
result had it been submitted. This 
gap raises several important con­
cerns for employers.
The case commenced after 
United Airlines refused to hire twin 
sisters with severe myopia for posi­
tions as global commercial airline 
pilots. Both sisters met U nited’s 
basic age, education, experience, and 
FAA-certification requirements.18 
W ith corrective measures, both 
sisters function identically to indi­
viduals who are not myopic. United 
denied them employment because 
they did not meet the employer’s 
vision requirement o f 20/100 un­
corrected visual acuity or better. 
They brought suit under the ADA 
alleging that they were discrimi­
nated against based on their 
disability.
As a threshold matter, the Su­
preme Court examined whether the 
sisters qualified as “disabled” under 
the ADA. W ith corrective lenses, 
both sisters were clearly not dis­
abled, so the court needed only to 
determine whether to evaluate the 
sisters with their glasses on or off. 
The court held that the sisters were 
not disabled because their vision 
was not impaired when they wore 
their glasses.
The court presented three argu­
ments supporting its conclusion to 
apply the act to the Sutton sisters in 
their corrected-vision state. First, the 
court wrote that the phrase “sub­
stantially limits” appears in the act in 
the present indicative verb form, 
which demonstrates that Congress 
intended to protect individuals pres­
ently, not potentially or hypotheti-
18See: Sutton at 2143.
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cally substantially limited by their 
impairment [emphasis added].19
Second, the court pointed out 
that the definition o f disability also 
requires that “disabilities be evalu­
ated ‘with respect to an individual’ 
and be determined based on 
whether an impairment substantially 
limits the major life activities of 
such individual.”20 The act should 
therefore be applied not categori­
cally to individuals, but rather on a 
case-by-case basis. This individual­
ized approach lends additional sup­
port for the court’s conclusion to 
examine both the positive and nega­
tive effects o f the individual’s im­
pairment, and any corrective mea­
sures taken with respect to such 
impairments.
Third, the court noted that Con­
gress did not intend to extend ADA 
protection so broadly that it would 
take in individuals with correctable 
conditions.21
The Sutton twins next alleged 
that they were regarded by the de­
fendant as having an impairment. 
The sisters argued that United Air­
lines mistakenly believed that their 
myopia substantially limited them in 
the major life activity o f working.22 
They further claimed that the vision 
requirement set by the airline was 
based on “myth and stereotype” and 
that the requirement substantially 
limited their ability to engage in 
the major life activity o f working 
by precluding them from obtaining 
the job of global airline pilot, 
which they argued is a “class of 
employment.”23
19Id. at 2146.
20Id. at 2147.
21The court noted that the ADA was intended 
only to benefit “some 43,000,000 Americans 
[who] have one or more physical or mental 
disability” (citing §12101(a)(l)), and that “indi­
viduals with disabilities are a discrete and insular 
minority” persons “subjected to a history o f  
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a 
position o f  political powerlessness in our society” 
(citing §12101(a)(7)). See Id. at 2147-48.
22 Id. at 2150.
23Id.
To the contrary, the court held 
that when the major fife function 
allegedly being limited is that o f 
working the restriction must apply 
to the ability to perform either an 
entire “class o f jobs,” or a “broad 
range o f jobs in various classes.”24 
Here, the court noted that the 
Suttons were restricted from doing 
only a single, particular job, a re­
striction that does not constitute a 
substantial limitation in the major 
life activity o f working.25 This is 
because the sisters’ myopia disquali­
fied them only from the position as 
global pilot. It did not restrict them 
from jobs that used the same set o f 
knowledge, skills, or abilities such as 
courier pilot, pilot instructor, or 
regional pilot.
The gap. A gap in the Suttons’ 
argument calls into question the 
relevance o f the Sutton holding. The 
O ’Connor majority wrote: “Peti­
tioners do not make the obvious 
argument that they are regarded due 
to their impairments as substantially 
limited in the major fife activity o f 
seeing. They contend only that re­
spondent mistakenly believes their 
physical impairments substantially 
limit them in the major life function 
o£ working” [emphasis added].26 In 
other words, the plaintiffs failed to 
argue that the employer mistakenly 
labeled them as being impaired 
when they are not. Had they done 
so, it is possible the employees 
would be protected by the act.
Because the court did not address 
the unmade contention, it is unclear 
whether it referred to the absent 
argument as “obvious” because it 
would obviously fail or because the 
result would have been different had 
it been included. This omitted argu­
ment leaves open the question of 
whether the Sutton sisters could 
have prevailed by arguing that
24Id. at 2151.
25Id.
26Id. at 2150.
The Supreme Court held that 
two nearsighted, would-be 
pilots were not disabled 
because their vision was not 
impaired when they wore 
their glasses.
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United regarded them as having 
substantially impaired sight, even 
though their corrective lenses ren­
dered the impairment non-limiting.
Effects of the Three Cases
The three cases have two clear ef­
fects and leave open one question. 
First, when plaintiffs seek redress 
under the ADA, any and all self­
administered measures to alleviate 
their impairments are to be consid­
ered in determining whether such 
individuals are substantially limited 
in one or more major life activities. 
Second, employers may refuse to 
hire or retain employees with cor­
rected or correctable impairments if 
such conditions prevent the em­
ployees from satisfying government- 
imposed job criteria, as was the case 
in Albertsons and Murphy. In such 
situations employers may argue that 
they did not regard the employee as 
disabled but instead were simply 
basing an employment decision on 
the employee’s inability to meet job 
requirements set by the government. 
Similarly, even when an employ­
ment criterion is set by the em­
ployer itself, such as the visual- 
acuity requirement in Sutton, so 
long as working is the only substan­
tially impaired “major life activity” 
alleged by the employee, the 
employer’s defense that it regarded 
the employee as unfit only for a 
particular job is a powerful one.
The question left unanswered is 
whether the defense that worked in 
Murphy is available to employers 
without any pre-set standards for 
hiring. For example, in Sutton, the 
employer had established the vision 
criterion and refused to hire em­
ployees who could not meet it. Can 
the employer successfully argue that 
it did not regard particular employ­
ees as disabled, and instead, just re­
garded them as being unable to 
satisfy the job requirements? Again, 
this defense is successful when the 
government sets the criteria. It is
unclear how the court would react 
to an employee’s argument that the 
requirement itself is evidence that 
the company unlawfully regards all 
those with less than 20/100 vision 
as disabled. • • •
Changing the Nature of 
Discrimination Law
In Kolstad v. American Dental Associa­
tion the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue o f when punitive damages 
are available under TitleVII, the 
section o f law that prohibits dis­
crimination based on sex, race, 
color, national origin, and religion.27 
The law did not at first include a 
right to jury trial, and damages were 
limited to back pay, reinstatement, 
attorney’s fees, and costs. The Civil 
Rights Act o f 1991 amended Title 
VII by providing for jury trials and 
the possibility of punitive and com­
pensatory damages. According to 
the 1991 amendments, punitive 
damages were available if the plain­
tiff proved that the employer “en­
gaged in discriminatory practices 
with malice or with reckless indif­
ference to the federally protected 
rights o f an aggrieved individual.”28 
The question that employers, plain­
tiffs, and courts pondered was, what 
is the difference between intention­
ally discriminatory conduct and 
malicious or reckless discriminatory 
conduct? This is the question that 
the court addressed in Kolstad.
The Kolstad trial court held that 
for the jury to be allowed to con­
sider a request for punitive damages 
the plaintiff had to show that the 
employer engaged in “egregious” 
conduct. O n appeal, a three-judge 
panel o f the United States Court o f 
Appeals for the District o f Colum­
bia Circuit (the DC Circuit) re­
versed the decision. The employer
2778 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e 
et seq.
28Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§1981 (b)(1).
moved to have the case reheard 
en banc, meaning that all the judges 
in the circuit would hear the case.
In a divided opinion, the en banc 
majority reversed the panel’s deci­
sion and affirmed the trial court’s 
opinion. Because of the split be­
tween the en banc majority and the 
first panel decision, the Supreme 
Court decided to hear the case and 
decide whether Title VII’s punitive 
damages are limited to instances 
where employers engaged in egre­
gious behavior, or instead are gener­
ally available.
Not egregious. The Supreme 
Court rejected the en banc holding, 
held that to satisfy the malicious or 
reckless standard plaintiffs need not 
prove that the employers’ conduct 
was egregious, and identified three 
narrow instances when punitive 
damages would not be available. 
Presumably, then, punitive damages 
will be available in all other cases.
The three narrow situations set 
forth by the court provide little 
security for employers charged with 
a civil-rights violation. First, the 
court stated that punitive damages 
would not be available if the em­
ployer was unaware o f the relevant 
law.29 It seems likely that the in­
stances in which such “unawareness” 
is credited by the jury is limited.30 
Second, the court cited instances 
where the theory o f discrimination 
is novel or otherwise poorly recog­
nized.31 Even though such a sce­
nario is more plausible than the 
court’s first instance, those situations 
are extremely rare. Employers may 
be unaware of so-called poorly rec­
ognized prohibitions, but employ­
ment lawyers are not. A good law­
yer will recognize the issue, inform
29Kolstad, at 20.
30That exact argument was advanced publicly 
in November 1999, when an immigrant Thai 
restaurateur in Miami added a service charge to 
the checks o f African-American parties, but not 
those o f  other groups. He subsequently agreed to 
levy the service charge evenhandedly.
31 Kolstad, at 20.
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the employer that it has violated the 
law, and the case will be settled. As 
for novel areas, few employers wish 
to endure the costs o f a trial on 
novel issues; so again, most o f those 
cases settle. Finally, the court stated 
that the employer may believe that 
the discrimination is justified be­
cause of a bona fide  occupational 
qualification, or “BFOQ.”32 A 
BFOQ is an affirmative defense that 
is available in the limited instances 
where discrimination is necessary to 
accomplish the essence of a job.33 
For example, courts have accepted 
the BFOQ defense in the entertain­
ment field, where authenticity is 
often a vital component o f a pro­
duction. Thus, a casting director can, 
for example, refuse to hire a woman 
to play Michael Jordan in the bas­
ketball star’s biography. Another 
instance where the BFOQ was ac­
cepted was when a prison refused to 
hire women as guards at a prison 
holding only men. The court ac­
cepted that a guard’s job was to 
control prisoners and that a woman, 
just by her presence, would make 
the prisoners lose control.34 Again, 
only rarely has an employer know­
ingly discriminated because it be­
lieved that such a BFOQ defense 
was available.
In the vast majority of cases, em­
ployees allege that they suffered an 
adverse employment action because 
o f their protected class. In turn, 
employers claim that they were 
motivated by non-discriminatory 
reasons (e.g., the individual’s poor 
performance,business downturns).
32id.
33See: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (establishing 
“where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona 
fide  occupational qualification,” a potential 
defense to Title VII claims exists for employers). 
For a discussion o f the BFO Q exception, see: Jon 
P. McConnell, “Bare Trap:The Legal Pitfall o f  
Requiring Scanty Costumes,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 
(November 1985), pp. 78-82.
34See: Dothard, Director; Dept, o f Public Safety o f
Alabama, et al. v. Rawlingson, et al. 433 U.S. 321;
97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
In those cases the jury decides 
whom to believe. Prior to the 
Kolstad case, juries could find for the 
plaintiff, but absent some egregious 
behavior, punitive damages were 
unavailable. Moreover, since back 
pay is reduced by the income an 
employee earns in the period be­
tween the termination of employ­
ment and the trial, back-pay awards 
are often small. W ith the Kolstad 
decision, however, punitive damages 
may be nearly automatic.
A new ball game. The magni­
tude of potential damages available 
greatly affects settlement negotia­
tions.35 Prior to Kolstad, the value of 
a Title VII case rarely included the 
possibility of anything more than 
back pay.36 Thus, management attor­
neys knew that they could settle a 
case for back pay less what the 
plaintiff earned in the interim. 
Kolstad may have changed the cal­
culus. Now, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be 
able to include the prospect o f pu­
nitive damages in settlement nego­
tiations. Management will rarely 
convince the plaintiff’s lawyer that 
the employer did not know that the 
alleged conduct was illegal, that the 
issue was poorly recognized or 
novel, or that it had a good-faith 
BFOQ defense.
An out. The court did give 
employers what appears to be an 
out when it wrote that “ ...in the 
punitive-damages context, an em­
ployer may not be vicariously liable 
for the discriminatory employment 
decisions of managerial agents
35See: David Sherwyn, Bruce Tracey, and Zev 
Eigen:“In Defense o f  Mandatory Arbitration o f  
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
Out the BathWater, and Constructing a N ew  
Sink in the Process,” 2 U.PA. J. LAB & EMPL. L. 
73, 81-83 (1999), which explains how employers 
sometimes settle even meritless claims based in 
"part on the fear o f large damage awards.
36Plaintiff’s lawyers would, o f  course, seek to 
inflate the value o f their cases by including costs 
o f defense and attorney fees in negotiations. 
These figures are relevant once the parties have 
engaged in litigation and attorneys from both 
sides have put in significant time.
where these decisions are contrary 
to the employer’s ‘good-faith’ efforts 
to comply with Title VII.”37 Since 
most employers do try to comply 
with Title VII— and all employers 
should do so— this language appears 
to provide a defense to possible 
punitive damages under Kolstad.
Unfortunately, because the court’s 
language is so vague, one cannot be 
sure whether employers will be 
protected in such an instance. The 
reason for this uncertainty is that 
the court failed to answer at least 
three questions: (1) what is a good- 
faith effort?; (2) whose burden is it 
to prove?; and (3) who decides 
whether the company acted in good 
faith, a jury or a judge?
No legal authority defines what 
constitutes a good-faith effort to 
comply with Title VII. Good faith, 
however, seems to be a less-stringent 
standard than reasonable care, for 
instance. A court held in 1998 that 
employers could avoid liability for 
hostile-environment sexual harass­
ment o f supervisors against employ­
ees if the “employer exercised rea­
sonable care to prevent such 
harassment” and the employee failed 
to take advantage of those proce­
dures. Reasonable care is an objec­
tive standard and focuses on the 
employer’s actions, but it is also clear 
that good faith is to be judged by 
actions, for the court created the 
good-faith provision to encourage 
employers to “adopt antidiscrimina­
tion policies and to educate their 
personnel on Title VII’s prohibi­
tions.”38 While employers must en­
gage in assertive actions to comply
37Kolstad, at 35 (citing the Appellate Court’s 
decision 139 F.3d 958, 974 (1998) Tatel, J., dis­
senting). Apparent good-faith observance o f Title 
VII was not successful for the Miami restaurant 
Joe’s Stone Crabs. See: David Sherwyn, Melenie 
Lankau, and Zev Eigen, “The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly: The Peculiar Discrimination Case o f  
Joe’s Stone Crabs,” Cornell H otel and Restaurant 
Administration Quarterly,Vol. 40, N o. 5 (October 
1999), pp. 10-17.
38Kolstad, at 32.
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with this standard, there are no di­
rectives as to what constitutes com­
pliance. W ithout a more definite 
directive, employers will have to 
wait for years o f litigation to know 
whether good faith is achieved with 
an EEO  policy alone or whether 
the company needs to include other 
remedies, such as training, one-on- 
one conversations, and affirmative- 
action programs.
Even if  we knew what good faith 
means, we do not know which side 
has to prove good faith or its ab­
sence. Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether good faith is a jury ques­
tion, or one to be decided by a 
judge. This distinction will greatly 
affect the results o f punitive-damage 
cases. If, for instance, the employer 
must prove to a jury that it acted in 
good faith, we predict that punitive 
damage awards will be common- 
place. Alternatively, it will be easier 
for employers to prevail if the plain­
tiff has the burden of proving to a 
judge that the employer, as a matter 
of law, failed to exercise good faith. 
Again, because the court’s language 
is vague, it will take years o f litiga­
tion for those cases to be resolved. 
We believe that most courts will 
place the burden o f proof of the 
good-faith standard on employers. 
We base this prediction on the fact 
that the Kolstad opinion refers to 
the Supreme C ourt’s sexual- 
harassment cases, which hold that 
to avoid liability for the action of a 
supervisor, an employer must prove 
that it exercised reasonable care 
and that the employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the 
procedures put in place by the 
employer.39
One other problem with the 
good-faith standard is that most 
employers centralize employment 
decisions to minimize liability. The 
theory is that a human-resources
39See: Burlington Industries v. E llertk  524 U.S. 
742; 118 S. Crt. Ct. 2257 (1998); Farnghen v.
Boca R aton; and 524 U.S. 775,118 S. Ct. 2275 
(1998).
specialist, unlike a line supervisor, is 
sensitive to legal compliance, has 
institutional knowledge as to what 
types of conduct result in different 
employment actions, and will not 
base decisions on personal factors. 
Employers believe that juries are 
more likely to credit nondiscrimina- 
tory reasons put forth by an H R  
professional than they would those 
by the employee’s direct supervisor. 
While this strategy still makes sense 
for liability purposes, it may backfire 
on employers attempting to use the 
good-faith argument. It seems that 
juries will have a difficult time find­
ing that an employer acted in good 
faith after finding that its H R  pro­
fessional, the person in charge of 
Title VII compliance, discriminated.
The Cleveland Case: 
Disabled but Qualified to Work
In Cleveland v. Policy Management 
Systems Corporation, the plaintiff sued 
her employer for discrimination 
based on her disability after she 
suffered a stroke and lost her job.40 
Prior to filing the lawsuit, the plain­
tiff applied for Social Security Dis­
ability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. In 
making out the SSDI application, 
the plaintiff, as she was required to 
do, swore that she was totally dis­
abled. To be protected by the ADA, 
however, an employee must be 
qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job with or without 
a reasonable accommodation. Both 
the district court and the court of 
appeals for the Fifth Circuit dis­
missed the case, holding that an 
employee cannot simultaneously be 
totally disabled and qualified to 
perform the essential functions of 
the job. The Supreme Court re­
versed those holdings.
The Supreme Court held that 
being totally disabled and being 
qualified to work are not mutually
40119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
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exclusive. Instead, the court held 
that “pursuit and receipt o f SSDI 
benefits does not automatically es­
top the recipient from pursuing an 
ADA claim. N or does the law erect 
a strong presumption against the 
recipient’s success under the ADA.”41 
The court did not ignore the incon­
sistency between the two statutes, 
however. It stated: “ [A]n ADA plain­
tiff cannot simply ignore the appar­
ent contradiction that arises out of 
the earlier SSDI total disability 
claim.”42 To survive the defendant 
employer’s motion for summary 
judgment, she must explain why the 
SSDI contention is consistent with 
her ADA claim that she could “per­
form the essential functions” of her 
previous job, at least with a “reason­
able accommodation.”43
O n its face, the opinion makes 
little sense. How can an employee 
be qualified to perform a job and be 
totally disabled at the same time? 
The social-security statute does not 
explain the court’s holding. To be 
awarded SSDI benefits, a plaintiff 
must show that the impairment at 
issue is “of such severity that [she] is 
not only unable to do [her] previous 
work but cannot, considering [her] 
age, education, and work experi­
ence, engage in any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists 
in the national economy.”44 The 
court justified its decision by focus­
ing on the concept of reasonable 
accommodation.
Under the ADA, employers have 
an obligation to provide disabled 
employees with a reasonable accom­
modation, including “job restructur­
ing, part-time or modified work 
schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification 
of equipment or devices, appropri­
ate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified
41 Id. at 1600.
42Id. at 1603.
4Hd.
44See: §423(d)(2)(A).
readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations.”45 Con­
versely, the SSDI eligibility does not 
take accommodations into account. 
Moreover, the Social Security Ad­
ministration (SSA) operates with 
limited resources, according to the 
court, and thus restricts its inquiries 
to the following five-step formula:
Step one: Are you presently work­
ing? (If so, you are ineligible.)46
Step two: Do you have a “severe 
impairment,” that is, one that “sig­
nificantly limits” your ability to do 
basic work activities? (If not, you 
are ineligible.)47
Step three: Does your impairment 
“mee[t] or equa[l]” an impairment 
on a specific [and fairly lengthy] 
SSA list? (If so, you are eligible 
without more proof.)48
Step four: If your impairment does 
not meet or equal a listed impair­
ment, can you perform your “past 
relevant work?” (If so, you are ineli­
gible.)49
Step five: If your impairment does 
not meet or equal a listed impair­
ment and you cannot perform your 
“past relevant work,” then can you 
perform other jobs that exist in 
significant numbers in the national 
economy? (If not, you are eligible.)50
Sixty percent o f the awards are 
based on the employee’s meeting 
one of the enumerated disabilities 
set forth in step three above. The 
government uses such a simplistic 
test so that it can administer a large 
benefits system efficiently. The test 
is over-inclusive so that those who 
truly need the benefits will not be 
denied. Thus, according to the 
court, an individual could be eli­
gible to receive SSDI benefits and 
be qualified, due to special circum­
stances, to perform the jo b ’s essen­
tial functions.
4542 U.S.C. §12111(9)(B).
46See: 20 CFR §404.1520(b) (1998).
47See: §404.1520(c).
48See: §§404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
49See: §404.1520(e).
50See: §§404.1520(f), 404.1560(c).
This holding brings up a ques­
tion. Should the practical realities of 
an overworked, underbudgeted 
agency allow employees to claim 
that they are both totally disabled 
and qualified to work? The court 
responded as follows. Inconsistencies 
in theories are common in our legal 
system. For example, the following 
argument is perfectly acceptable in 
court: “I was not at the scene of the 
murder. However, if I was, I did not 
hold the gun. If I did, my gun was 
not loaded. If it was loaded, I did 
not pull the trigger.” Here we have 
a similar scenario. The plaintiff may 
allege that she is able to perform the 
essential functions of the job, and if 
she cannot she is totally disabled. In 
the time that it takes for the issue 
o f qualifications to be resolved the 
plaintiff needs to live. She applies 
for SSDI benefits in the interim 
because neither her former em­
ployer nor any other employer will 
hire her.
The Minefield
Some of these cases have been 
widely reported, but whether the 
media reaction was reality or hype is 
unclear. Based on the “gap” in the 
ADA cases, we suggest that employ­
ers not base employment decisions 
on corrected impairments unless 
forced by government regulations 
to do so.
W ith regard to Kolstad, employers 
should ensure that they have EEOC 
policies and that they document all 
efforts to comply with Title VII. 
Such documentation may prevent 
a punitive-damages award. Along 
those same lines, employers can 
expect that demands by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers always will include punitive 
damages.
Finally, employers can no longer 
avoid ADA liability in cases where 
an employee has filed for SSDI 
benefits. Such a fifing will force the 
plaintiff to jump through another 
hoop in an ADA case, but it will not 
be an automatic bar to a lawsuit. CQ
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